‘TRUMP AND AMERICAN DEEP STATE’ The Stepping Stones of the Talk by Gen Asad Durrani 5 MS-TFP

‘TRUMP AND AMERICAN DEEP STATE’ The Stepping Stones of the Talk by Gen Asad Durrani 5 MS-TFP

  • When Trump announce his “Af-Pak policy” in September 2017, the hue and cry in our Media and amongst our (pathetic) strategic community, should have made many of us to think.
  • When Trump announce his “Af-Pak policy” in September 2017, the hue and cry in our Media and amongst our (pathetic) strategic community, should have made many of us to think.
  • If it was because of the belligerent tone—weren’t we taught that the ‘barking dogs seldom bite’, or ‘empty vessels made more noise’? But then since we are usually fed on rhetoric, maybe we have gotten used to taking it seriously! Even then, one could have pointed out that he used harsher words for Iran and South Korea; so why weren’t they in panic?
     
  • And if it was some ‘new policy’, then what was different from the old one? All that he threatened us with—drones, vilification, sanctions—we have been there before. Obama spoke softly but his minions delivered the hard part. This time around, it’s the POTUS who shoots with his mouth and his team—mostly generals with some experience of our Region, not necessarily having learnt much—try to play the “good cop”.
     
  • Perhaps most importantly, if none of Trumps declared objectives/ desires—Détente with Russia, screwing NATO/ Europe, building the Mexican wall, abrogating the nuclear deal with Iran, disengaging the American military from wars abroad—were making any headway (on immigrants too only some superficial movement), what were the chances that the 16 years US’ Af-Pak policy would change? Remember when Obama tried to exit from Afghanistan post his policy announcement on 1.12.2009, how astutely his own Military subverted it?
     
  • And just in case, one were to point out that “the surge” and granting bigger role to India were qualitative changes, one should get his/her head examined. 4000 additional troops! Once there were over a 100,000. And those who cannot even help their client regime—whitewashed as the “government of Afghanistan”—win more room within the country; how would they grant any greater away to India. India already has the clout that the totality of the environment in South Asia permits it.
  • I think it is time we give a little deeper thought to the American aims in Afghanistan.   
  • One could start by refraining from giving the “sole superpower” any advice; repeating the mantra that without Pakistan it had no chance to restore peace in Afghanistan; and most pitifully, that the “war was no solution”.
     
  • It should have dawned on some of us by now that peace—generally, but in regions like ours and the Middle East, especially—was NOT in American interest.
  • Conflict helps outsiders—the US more than all others—to play one country (or a faction) against the other.
     
  • Lingering wars benefit its mighty military-security complex.
     
  • Where it has weaker cards to exploit the strategic or natural resources than its rivals—think our regions again—the conflicts act as spoiler.
     
  • The “Ummah” was not likely to unite in the foreseeable future, but why take a chance?
     
  • Time also to shed the illusion that only—whatever passes as—our thinking or vocal voices know what was good for the country. The state too can come up with an odd good idea.
  • During the last about a decade Pakistan’s security establishment has worked upon evolving—what under the circumstances might be the best possible—regional response. We mended fences with Iran, reached out to Russia, with China already on board and Turkey joining because of its disillusionment with its NATO allies, our exterior maneuver is not too bad.
     
  • Home base is always crucial. Many weaknesses there, but then that we all know.